

II. - NILE BASIN

1. EGYPT

The demography of this most densely-populated of Arab and Mediterranean countries is not the easiest to pin down. The plentiful statistical data available in this highly concentrated and centralized country cannot be taken at face value, because inconsistencies abound. Findings may conflict according to whether population growth is approached from the traditional sources of censuses and registration records, or fertility and maternal and child health surveys¹. Also, there are uncertainties about the comprehensively censused total population. The residence status of Egyptians from abroad is not always clearly specified in the statistics, for example.

But measurement is not the only problem. Egypt's demographic transition has not gone smoothly, after the manner of the Maghreb countries, for example. An early, consistent population policy resulting in rapid fertility decline in the Sixties was rapidly thrown into question after the death of Nasser. Education-specific fertility differentials do not always fit the standard patterns. Such is Egypt's influence in the Mediterranean region that special attention must be paid to its demographic future, particularly as its uncertain transition could within a bare generation's span turn it into the region's only demographic giant (with a 100 million-plus population). The materials for this forecast by educational level are provided by the recently-published findings of the last DHS survey in Egypt² (table 1).

Table 1. - Egypt. Recent trend of total fertility rate by female educational level:

Period	EMCHS 91 1986-90	DHS 92 1990-92	DHS 95 1993-95
Uneducated	5.69	5.03	4.57
Incomplete primary	4.74	3.98	3.72
Complete primary, Incomplete secondary	3.68	3.01	3.07
Secondary and above	2.99	2.91	3.00

Sources: 1986-1990, CAPMAS, *Egypt Maternal and Child Health Survey 1991*, Cairo 1993.

1990-92, National Population Council, *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 1992*, Cairo, 1993.

1993-95, National Population Council, *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 1995*, op. cit.

¹ On this, see Philippe Fargues, "Ce que l'on peut encore apprendre des sources conventionnelles: état civil et recensements", *The New Demography of the Arab World* _ American University of Cairo, Cairo, December 1996, Youssef Courbage, "L'imprévisible fécondité égyptienne", *Population*, 1, 1994 and "La politique démographique en Egypte et son évaluation _ Que nous apprennent les enquêtes récentes" *Population*, 4_5, 1994.

² National Population Council, *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 1995*, Calverton/Cairo, 1996. Due to fluctuations in the proportions curve, extrapolations for future generations were made using the 15_19 and 20_24 year age groups by arithmetic rather than geometric progression.

In 1995, one in every five women aged 15-19 was still functionally illiterate. The current rapid rise in female enrolments, however, will reduce illiteracy to residual levels by the forecast date, with a high concentration of reproductive age women in secondary or post-secondary education (table 2).

Table 2. - Egypt. Female educational distribution (%)

Age	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
			Illiterate				
15-19	19.4	17.1	15.1	13.3	11.7	10.3	9.1
20-24	27.8	19.4	17.1	15.1	13.3	11.7	10.3
25-29	36.4	27.8	19.4	17.1	15.1	13.3	11.7
30-34	40.0	36.4	27.8	19.4	17.1	15.1	13.3
35-39	44.4	40.0	36.4	27.8	19.4	17.1	15.1
40-44	47.5	44.4	40.0	36.4	27.8	19.4	17.1
45-49	54.7	47.5	44.4	40.0	36.4	27.8	19.4
			Incomplete primary				
15-19	8.2	5.7	4.0	2.8	2.0	1.4	1.0
20-24	11.6	8.2	5.7	4.0	2.8	2.0	1.4
25-29	16.5	11.6	8.2	5.7	4.0	2.8	2.0
30-34	20.4	16.5	11.6	8.2	5.7	4.0	2.8
35-39	23.5	20.4	16.5	11.6	8.2	5.7	4.0
40-44	22.2	23.5	20.4	16.5	11.6	8.2	5.7
45-49	21.4	22.2	23.5	20.4	16.5	11.6	8.2
			Complete primary and Incomplete secondary				
15-19	23.2	22.0	19.7	16.7	13.1	9.1	4.7
20-24	17.4	23.2	22.0	19.7	16.7	13.1	9.1
25-29	9.9	17.4	23.2	22.0	19.7	16.7	13.1
30-34	9.5	9.9	17.4	23.2	22.0	19.7	16.7
35-39	9.9	9.5	9.9	17.4	23.2	22.0	19.7
40-44	12.8	9.9	9.5	9.9	17.4	23.2	22.0
45-49	13.1	12.8	9.9	9.5	9.9	17.4	23.2
			Secondary and above				
15-19	49.2	55.2	61.2	67.2	73.2	79.2	85.2
20-24	43.2	49.2	55.2	61.2	67.2	73.2	79.2
25-29	37.2	43.2	49.2	55.2	61.2	67.2	73.2
30-34	30.1	37.2	43.2	49.2	55.2	61.2	67.2
35-39	22.2	30.1	37.2	43.2	49.2	55.2	61.2
40-44	17.5	22.2	30.1	37.2	43.2	49.2	55.2
45-49	10.8	17.5	22.2	30.1	37.2	43.2	49.2

Source: Extrapolated on the basis of the DHS Survey 1995.

But while there is no doubt about the rise in educational levels, the same cannot be said for education-specific fertility decline. This finding, previously made by a detailed comparison of fertility by female educational level between the 1976 and 1986 censuses³, is again borne out by two independent sources - an internal comparison of the

³ Youssef Courbage, "L'imprévisible fécondité égyptienne", *op. cit.*

1992 Egyptian DHS survey findings⁴ which revealed that fertility had declined significantly only among illiterate women and those with basic literacy skills, but had remained unchanged or actually risen among women with basic literacy skills and well-educated women. The most recent DHS survey in 1995 confirms this conclusion. This bucks the trend in the Maghreb countries in particular.

The education-specific fertility trends are unclear (table 2). Taking only the period covered by the most recent surveys, it is clear that while fertility among the functionally illiterate population is decreasing by 3.1% a year, and slightly less for those with basic literacy skills but an incomplete primary education (-2.2%), fertility is rising among the more educated women, both those with complete primary education and some secondary education (+0.4%) and those with complete secondary and higher education (+1.0%). This makes education-specific fertility forecasts difficult.

I have therefore had to slightly adjust the assumptions used for the Maghreb countries, where the pattern of fertility is fortunately clear. In the rapid decline scenario, fertility continues to fall at the trend rate for illiterate women and those with basic literacy skills (incomplete primary education); for the other categories, fertility is assumed to decline at the trend rate for illiterate women, although historic trends show no decrease. The underlying assumption is that this levelling-off of fertility is a passing anomaly, and that after a period of stagnation the trend will resume its normal course (in Morocco and Tunisia, fertility among secondary-educated women has fallen below replacement). In the slow decline scenario, fertility decline is halved for all categories.

Baseline fertility - 3.62 in 1995 - calculated by combining the adjusted data of the 1995 DHS survey, centred on 1994, and registration data, puts Egypt's fertility relatively high compared to the Maghreb, especially Tunisia which, along with Egypt, was a standard-bearer of family planning programmes in the Arab world. On the basis of these assumptions, fertility transition is projected to be relatively slow in both scenarios: not until 2020 will Egyptian fertility fall to replacement in the rapid decline scenario, and 10 years later in the slow decline scenario (table 3).

⁴ The period fertility data by educational level in the 1992 survey for two periods preceding the survey are:

Year of study	4_7 years pre-survey	0_3 years pre-survey	Annual change
0	6.1	5.6	-2.8%
1_3	5.1	5.5	+2.8%
4_6	4.7	4.1	-4.4%
7_9	3.4	3.4	0.0%
10+	3.3	3.4	+1.0%

Table 3. - Egypt. Projected total fertility rate according to 2 decline scenarios:

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
	Scenario 1*						
Uneducated	4.44	3.81	3.27	2.81	2.41	2.10	2.10
Incomplete primary	3.67	3.29	2.95	2.65	2.38	2.10	2.10
Complete primary, Incomplete secondary	3.07	2.63	2.26	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10
Secondary and above	3.00	2.57	2.21	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10
ALL	3.62	3.03	2.53	2.27	2.16	2.10	2.10
	Scenario 2*						
Uneducated	4.44	4.11	3.81	3.53	3.03	2.64	2.30
Incomplete primary	3.67	3.48	3.29	3.12	2.95	2.57	2.23
Complete primary, Incomplete secondary	3.07	2.90	2.75	2.60	2.47	2.15	2.10
Secondary and above	3.00	2.84	2.69	2.55	2.41	2.10	2.10
ALL	3.62	3.29	3.01	2.78	2.54	2.20	2.13

* Scenario 1 = Rapid fertility decline. Scenario 2 = Slow fertility decline

Source: Extrapolated individual fertility decline trends.

Table 4. - Egypt. Population size 1995-2025 (thousands), according to the 2 forecast scenarios, UN 1998 and 2000

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
Scenario 1*	57686	63467	68960	74160	79130	83813	88252
Scenario 2*	57686	63775	70225	76842	83189	88733	93650
UN 1998	62282	68470	74535	80063	85224	90491	95615
UN 2000		67884	73807	79260	84425	89686	94777

* Scenario 1 = Rapid fertility decline. Scenario 2 = Slow fertility decline

Source: Calculation by the component method.

From an initial population size of 57.7 million in 1995⁵- Egypt's population will reach 88.3 million in the rapid decline scenario and 93.7 million in the slow decline scenario (table 4). But the 100 million mark is not too remote, and might be reached before 2040. Furthermore, an increase in return migration from the Arab peninsula and Libya due to a worsening political or economic situation, or simply the ageing of an emigrant population looking to retire back in Egypt, would be enough to push it up earlier to this symbolic 100 million, even if fertility decreases in line with the rapid decline scenario.

This is not far off the United Nations' projected population of 94.8 million by 2025. But the two baseline populations were not the same: the United Nations included Egyptians living abroad⁶. The United Nations projects a more rapid fertility transition - reaching the 2.1 children replacement level earlier in 2010-2015, whereas we are less optimistic, 2020 appearing as a more plausible target to reach replacement level. Indeed, during the last years, fertility as represented by the crude birth rate has levelled off or slightly increased : 26.2 p. thousand in 1992, 27.4 in 1993, 27.0 in 1994, 27.9 in 1995, 28.3 in 1996, 27.5 in 1997 and 27.5 in 1998. This puzzling trend might give some credit to scenario 2, rather than to scenario 1.

Fertility decline, therefore, will not stop the population of Egypt - a "small" country with less than 40 000 km² of net usable acreage - growing quickly by the advent of the next generation, adding 31 million people, or 53% of its 1995 population. The growth

⁵ This is the figure of the November 1996 population census : 59.3 million, projected backward to the middle of 1995. United Nations, UN ESCWA and US Bureau of the Census give usually much higher figures than those derived from the population census because they take into account Egyptians living abroad. Egypt is a major exporter of labour, CAPMAS (the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) estimates the Egyptian diaspora at 2.9 million in 1995 (inferred from the discrepant data in two tables in the Egyptian statistical yearbook); in any event, diaspora Egyptians should not be included in the current and future population to avoid duplication with the host country populations, primarily Arab countries. It is therefore a mystery why the United Nations should take the figure of 61.8 million in 1995, UN ESCWA the figure of 61.5 in 1996 and the US Bureau of the Census the figure of 62.4 million in 1995, which therefore includes the estimated number of Egyptians living abroad. The World Bank figure of 58.2 million in 1995 is more in line with the census figure of the resident population of Egypt (thus excluding those living abroad).

⁶ If forecast calculations are to include nationals living abroad, the United Nations should have applied this rule to Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, several million of whose nationals live out of country, not just Egypt.

rate will remain high both at the turn of the century (19.1 per 1000) and up to 2020-25 (10.3 per 1000). The population is projected to stabilize - in the event - only towards the end of the century, at approximately 140 million people.

Total annual births, however, which have fluctuated over the past ten years, will go into a marked downturn: the estimated 1 570 000 births for 1995-2000 will decline steadily to 2020-2025. This long-term, uniform decline contrasts with that of the Maghreb countries where frequent and significantly irregular fluctuations are likely to appear. The share of the under-15 population will decrease significantly: from 37.7% in 1995 to just 23.1% in 2025. Ageing will be significant - from 3.4% to 8.6% of people aged 65 and over - but less pronounced than in the Maghreb countries because of Egypt's late fertility transition.

Annual labour force accessions (currently estimated at 1.5 million young people in 2000, both sexes combined) will fluctuate over the next 25 years, reaching 1.4 million in 2025. By contrast, exits from the labour force - only 0.2 million in 2000 - will have tripled by 2025, which should relieve some labour market pressures. But will this demographic effect be enough to put order in the labour market? Will the domestic market be able to absorb the labour surpluses? What would happen were traditional receiving countries to shut their doors, or worse, in the event of mass labour return migration?

Ultimately, Egyptian population growth will have mixed effects. Its sheer population size and its advance over other regional giants are likely to reinforce Egypt's regional leadership. Also, its later fertility transition will delay ageing, an issue not much addressed in this region. On the other hand, the age-old problem of pressure on resources (water, cropland and inhabitable land, towns suffering from over-urbanization) and even desert reclamation (environmental damage) may be a source of legitimate although nowadays rarely voiced concerns.

Accompanying Table 1. - Egypt. Structure by broad age groups (%) (Variant 1 only)

Age	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
0-14	37.7	33.3	30.1	28.4	26.2	24.5	23.1
15-64	58.9	62.6	65.5	66.5	67.6	68.3	68.4
65+	3.4	4.1	4.4	5.1	6.1	7.2	8.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Accompanying Table 2. - Egypt. Crude birth rate, mortality, natural increase, migration and total growth (per 1000) (Variant 1 only)

Rates	1995- 2000	2000- 2005	2005- 2010	2010- 2015	2015- 2020	2020- 2025
Birth	25.9	23.1	20.8	19.0	17.5	16.4
Death	6.8	6.5	6.3	6.1	6.0	6.1
Nat. incr.	19.1	16.6	14.5	13.0	11.5	10.3
Migration	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Growth	19.1	16.6	14.5	13.0	11.5	10.3

Accompanying Table 3. - Egypt. Population (thousands) by five-year age group and sex

AGE	2000			2005			2010		
	Males	Females	Both	Males	Females	Both	Males	Females	Both
0 4	3681	3538	7219	3622	3471	7093	3567	3409	6976
5 9	3353	3197	6549	3624	3486	7110	3576	3428	7004
10 14	3815	3574	7388	3340	3187	6528	3613	3477	7090
15 19	3945	3670	7615	3798	3562	7361	3328	3179	6507
20 24	3479	3191	6670	3921	3653	7574	3779	3548	7327
25 29	2547	2350	4897	3453	3172	6625	3896	3634	7531
30 34	2026	2186	4212	2525	2333	4858	3427	3153	6581
35 39	1914	1914	3828	2004	2168	4172	2502	2317	4819
40 44	1831	1870	3701	1887	1894	3781	1980	2148	4127
45 49	1535	1491	3026	1793	1844	3637	1852	1870	3723
50 54	1322	1225	2547	1487	1461	2948	1743	1810	3553
55 59	917	967	1884	1258	1189	2447	1422	1422	2844
60 64	696	647	1343	850	923	1773	1175	1139	2314
65 69	605	618	1223	619	597	1216	764	857	1622
70 74	402	353	754	500	535	1035	519	522	1042
75+	303	306	609	403	399	802	527	574	1102
TOTAL	32371	31096	63467	35085	33875	68960	37672	36488	74160
AGE	2015			2020			2025		
	Males	Females	Both	Males	Females	Both	Males	Females	Both
0 4	3521	3356	6877	3480	3307	6786	3482	3300	6782
5 9	3532	3374	6906	3496	3328	6825	3465	3287	6752
10 14	3567	3421	6988	3526	3369	6895	3493	3325	6817
15 19	3603	3470	7072	3560	3415	6975	3521	3364	6885
20 24	3315	3168	6483	3592	3461	7052	3553	3408	6961
25 29	3760	3533	7293	3303	3158	6460	3583	3452	7035
30 34	3873	3616	7489	3743	3519	7262	3292	3148	6440
35 39	3401	3134	6535	3850	3598	7448	3727	3505	7232
40 44	2476	2298	4774	3373	3113	6486	3826	3578	7404
45 49	1949	2124	4073	2444	2276	4720	3338	3088	6426
50 54	1807	1840	3646	1907	2093	4001	2400	2247	4647
55 59	1675	1766	3441	1744	1800	3544	1850	2053	3903
60 64	1337	1367	2704	1585	1706	3291	1662	1745	3407
65 69	1067	1065	2132	1225	1287	2512	1467	1616	3083
70 74	650	757	1408	921	950	1871	1073	1160	2232
75+	623	684	1308	773	913	1686	1048	1197	2244
TOTAL	40156	38974	79130	42521	41292	83813	44778	43474	88252

2. SUDAN

In civil war-torn countries like Sudan, population forecasts must necessarily be on shakier ground than elsewhere. So, in the last population census (1993), the United Nations took the somewhat unusual step of adjusting the total population count by a factor of 6.7%, presumably to allow for undercounting in southern Sudan, where the predominantly Christian and animist populations are in a state of insurgency against the central government. The most recent DHS and PAPCHILD surveys⁷ surveyed only the populations of northern Sudan, so their findings are somewhat understated.

However, despite these uncertainties surrounding the real state of the population⁸, the sheer population size of this country of some 30 million inhabitants⁹, and its inseparability from the rest of the Arab world, especially Egypt, clamour for special attention - more especially to determine whether the United Nations sharp downward then upward revisions of the population in 2025 - from 58.4 million (1994) to 46.8-46.3 (1996 and 1998) million then 49.6 (2000)- between its 1994 and 2000 forecasts holds water.

There is no doubt that Sudanese fertility is declining; the big question is how much? The PAPCHILD 1992-1993 survey reported that by mid-1991, the period fertility rate had fallen to 4.54 children per woman. But from what baseline level? This is where the uncertainties arise. From 5.08, in mid-1987 as the DHS survey reports; from 6.08 in 1976, as the WFS 1978-79 survey reports? Or the 6.33 in 1985 and 6.97 in 1980 seemingly indicated by the PAPCHILD survey itself? The first of these, which suggests a more moderate decline, seems credible¹⁰. This is the trend used to project future fertility decline here.

The hypothesis of a less pronounced fertility decline than that evidenced by the PAPCHILD survey is borne out by the fact that differential fertility by female educational level is less marked than elsewhere:

Educational level	Period fertility rate
Illiterate	5.42
Basic literacy skills	4.72
Complete primary education	4.94
Middle school education	3.68
Secondary and above	3.67

⁷ Ministry of Health, Sudan, *Demographic and Health Survey 1989_1990*, Khartoum, 1993 and Ministry of Health, *Sudan Maternal and Child Health Survey 1993_1993*, Khartoum/Cairo, 1996.

⁸ A comprehensive treatment can be found in François Ireton, "Quelques aspects de l'évolution démographique du Soudan, 1956_1993", *Egypte Monde Arabe*, Cairo, 17, 1994.

⁹ No precise figure can be provided for the total population of Sudan. Hence, the present figure of 27 889 thousand in 1995 was derived from the last UN 2000 population forecasts. In their previous exercise, 1998, this figure was lower : 26 617. The US Bureau of the Census provides a figure of 30 567 thousands which seems excessive.

¹⁰ Given the population age-sex structure reported by the PAPCHILD survey 1993, suggesting a less pronounced fertility decrease than that offered by the survey's own birth histories.

Fertility among primary-educated women is slightly lower (-12.9%) than among functionally illiterate women (but those who complete primary education have slightly more children than those who did not).

The fall is sharper (-23%) among better-educated women (middle and secondary school), but this concerns only a minority of women (6% and 8% respectively of the 15-49 year age group). As a result, the total fertility rate trend in the two scenarios from a baseline of 4.08 in 1995 - the projected decrease between the survey and these forecasts' baseline date - will be: an annual decrease of 2.77% down to replacement level (rapid decline scenario), and half as much in the slow decline scenario.

If the - relatively moderate - downtrends pan out, the 2.1 children per woman level could be reached by 2020 (table 1), although UN forecasts put it at 2030-2035, which seems inordinately long. If fertility declines more slowly (slow decline scenario), the period fertility rate would remain relatively high in 2025: 2.70, close to United Nations forecasts of 2.75 in 2020-25 or US Bureau of the Census one : 2.78.

Table 1. - Sudan. Projected total fertility rate according to 2 decline scenarios:

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
Scenario 1*	4.08	3.55	3.10	2.70	2.36	2.10	2.10
Scenario 2 *	4.08	3.80	3.55	3.31	3.09	2.89	2.70

* Scenario 1 = Rapid fertility decline. Scenario 2 = Slow fertility decline

Source : Extrapolated fertility trends between the PAPCHILD 92/93 and DHS 89/90 surveys.

Table 2. - Sudan. Population size 1995-2025 (thousands) according to the 2 forecast scenarios, and UN 1998 and 2000:

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
Scenario 1*	27889	30282	32913	35582	38128	40405	42513
Scenario 2*	27889	30412	33452	36826	40354	43830	47137
UN 1998	26617	29490	32753	36257	39811	43194	46264
UN 2000		31095	34887	38667	42433	46114	49566

* Scenario 1 = Rapid fertility decline. Scenario 2 = Slow fertility decline

Source : Projected by the component method.

These revised forecasts put the Sudanese population at 42.5 million people in 2025. The UN adjustments predict a much higher figure of almost 50 million in 2025, which seems excessive according to emerging trends (table 2). Even the slow decline scenario predicts a lower population size than the UN forecasts : 47.1.

All this talk of figures may well seem academic in light of the inescapable new realities on the ground and decisions about the future of southern Sudan (current population approximately 8 million, including refugees, or more than a quarter of the country's population) which no-one can be certain will not break away by 2025. However that may be, Egypt will welcome the slowdown in Sudanese population growth, which could contribute indirectly to defuse the territorial dispute over the waters of the Nile.

Sudanese population growth will be held in check by continuing high mortality: death rates are still above 10 per 1000 and will remain high up to 2025. Population growth, therefore, could still remain modest over this forecast horizon - under 10 per 1000 in 2020-2025 - but attributable more to high mortality than a declining birth rate. The Sudanese population was one of the youngest in the Arab world - 41.6% in 1995 - but there will be only half as many young people in 2025 - 24.6%. The proportion of people aged 65 and over will remain almost constant oscillating around 5%.

Accompanying Table 1. - Sudan. Structure by broad age groups (%) (Variant 1 only)

Age	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
0-14	41.6	37.0	32.9	31.0	29.4	27.0	24.6
15-64	53.6	58.2	62.6	64.8	66.2	68.4	69.9
65+	4.8	4.8	4.5	4.2	4.4	4.6	5.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Accompanying Table 2. - Sudan. Crude birth rate, crude death rate, natural increase, migration and rate of growth (per 1000) (Variant 1 only)

Rates	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
Birth	28.8	27.6	25.5	22.7	19.6	17.7
Death	12.3	10.9	10.0	8.8	8.0	7.5
Nat. incr.	16.5	16.7	15.6	13.8	11.6	10.2
Migration	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Growth	16.5	16.7	15.6	13.8	11.6	10.2

Accompanying Table 3. - Sudan. Population (thousands) by five-year age group and sex

AGE	2000			2005			2010		
	Males	Females	Both	Males	Females	Both	Males	Females	Both
0 4	1847	1785	3632	1945	1878	3824	1978	1907	3886
5 9	1769	1778	3547	1773	1717	3490	1878	1817	3695
10 14	2025	2008	4033	1753	1763	3516	1759	1705	3464
15 19	1957	1826	3783	2007	1990	3997	1738	1750	3488
20 24	1620	1667	3286	1929	1804	3734	1982	1970	3952
25 29	1180	1329	2509	1592	1643	3235	1900	1782	3682
30 34	840	1161	2001	1158	1308	2466	1566	1620	3186
35 39	662	773	1434	822	1141	1963	1136	1288	2424
40 44	671	784	1456	644	757	1401	802	1120	1922
45 49	519	438	957	648	765	1413	624	740	1364
50 54	446	476	922	494	424	918	619	742	1361
55 59	411	268	678	416	454	870	462	406	869
60 64	235	365	600	370	249	619	376	425	801
65 69	292	335	627	201	324	525	318	223	541
70 74	191	136	327	227	273	501	158	268	426
75+	292	198	489	255	187	442	259	262	521
TOTAL	14956	15326	30282	16234	16679	32913	17556	18026	35582
AGE	2015			2020			2025		
	Males	Females	Both	Males	Females	Both	Males	Females	Both
0 4	1911	1841	3752	1779	1711	3490	1717	1651	3368
5 9	1920	1855	3776	1866	1800	3666	1746	1682	3428
10 14	1866	1806	3672	1910	1847	3756	1858	1794	3652
15 19	1747	1695	3441	1854	1797	3652	1900	1840	3740
20 24	1720	1735	3455	1731	1683	3414	1841	1788	3629
25 29	1956	1949	3906	1701	1720	3421	1716	1672	3388
30 34	1873	1761	3634	1932	1930	3862	1684	1707	3390
35 39	1539	1598	3137	1846	1741	3586	1908	1912	3820
40 44	1112	1267	2379	1510	1576	3086	1815	1720	3536
45 49	779	1098	1876	1083	1245	2327	1475	1551	3026
50 54	598	720	1318	749	1071	1820	1045	1217	2262
55 59	582	714	1295	564	695	1259	710	1036	1746
60 64	421	382	803	533	675	1207	519	660	1180
65 69	326	383	710	368	348	716	469	619	1088
70 74	253	187	440	263	325	587	300	298	598
75+	227	307	534	265	290	555	296	367	663
TOTAL	18830	19298	38128	19953	20452	40405	20999	21514	42513